A Second Swing at DAO First

  • Proposal to migrate BOND to BARN

  • Move DAO to Optimism

  • Align allocation & community interest.

  • Re-invigorate reward systems

  • Begin to utilize Snapshot for creating working groups and multisig management.

It’s important to point out that outside of moving the treasury, none of this really needs to be a DAO vote given we are discussing moving governance over to a new system similar to a soft fork. Because of that and to maximize the community’s ability to participate in this decision, we can honor a snapshot vote on the decisions around this proposal.

To start, I think all of this is existential given the current state of BarnBridge and a general loss of interest that started in the summertime. We’ve had self-organized working groups form via community members, companies/dev shops form to build on top of BarnBridge, and we’ve had quite a lot of internal and external discussions about this proposal.

So while this is a pretty massive change being proposed, I ultimately believe it fixes most of what has gone wrong with BarnBridge and improves upon the DAO first model.

We are proposing to start using multisigs that honor community snapshots for a wider range of governance, along with using Optimism to get the community more engaged (cheaper voting).

Migrate BOND to BARN, Move DAO to Optimism

ERC20: BARN

  • Mintable
  • No cap
  • Burnable

Timeline: 3 weeks

Q.xyz (NYC) Team:

  1. Itemize and airdrop dBOND to all the necessary addresses (dBOND is outlined below)*
  2. We will create a Gnosis safe with Multisig on main net
  3. We will create a Gnosis safe with Multisig on Optimism
  4. Mint BARN tokens on Optimsm ← send to Multisig (we will send to vault later)
  5. We will build a UI for the conversion

Timeline: 3 Weeks

South African Development Team:

  1. Bridge BARN to Optimism
  2. Launch Vault on Optimism + Mainnet that does this function:

Step A: Write event listener to listen for BOND or dBOND token transfers to mainnet vault
Step A2: This event will trigger step D
Step B: Deposit BOND or dBOND on mainnet vault
Step C: Mainnet vault sends BOND to mainnet multisig & burns dBOND
Step C2: This can be done on an interval, it doesn’t need to be done on every deposit
Step D: Optimism Vault sends BARN to mainnet depositors on Optimism

*The only way to get BARN is by holding BOND. For people locked on the DAO and vesting contracts, we snapshotted them as of January 26th, 2022 and will provide dBOND as an additional way to get BARN. For people with long out vesting or who did the right thing and staked on the DAO, they will get additional BARN in the future for their locked BOND but governance will be in charge of rebasing so their original BOND will be less % of the network than it currently is so they should come out about even.

Speed will be a factor, people will need to move over to the new system so we will be making announcements assuming this is the direction everyone chooses to go. We talked about allowing BOND to be convertible 1:1 with the BARN based on network % (deducting inflation or deflation) however, this creates misaligned incentives and attack vectors that would likely cause split governance or a hard fork. I’d prefer this be a soft fork instead of hard forking BarnBridge and renaming it (which was discussed at times when I mentioned I thought this move was existential to the protocol). Adding a necessity for speed of movement helps ensure this process is fast and seamless.

At this point in reading this, there will be a lot of questions about rebasing, when it starts, what APY, how to best avoid dilution etc. I’d address these items if possible. All of this will be decided by the community via snapshot votes that will be honored by the below outlined and proposed multisig. These actions can be turned off completely via a DAO vote and immediate timelines are discussed later in this document.

Send Treasury to Multisig for Conversion

When moving the DAO to Optimism, we need to ensure it doesn’t get locked with the treasury inside of it. Further, in an ongoing capacity, we will need to start using multisigs to honor snapshots for more simple money movement type votes (like the last one). For those, we have proposed an array of community members, Q.xyz members, Dmob members, investors, and advisors to manage this, similar to how other defi protocols like Olympus in order to be more nimble. We will use the bulk DAO to make protocol level changes and larger treasury movements, however, most of the month to month decisions should be transparent and voted on by the community with gasless voting.

We then can use this multisig to manage working groups. An ideal structure would look something like this:

All multisig holders are either community members with deep levels of participation in the protocol for over a year now, investors, or core team members.

This is an original framework, we can impeach and replace people based on Snapshot votes.

We should also send the secret service multisig funds to this wallet. The purpose of that wallet was provided by investors to deliver the whitepaper. At this point, I think it’s more prudent to allow for a more transparent multisig to report on where funds are going and so the community can be more involved in decisions going forward.

Re-align Team Shares

When we were originally starting BarnBridge, I was never supposed to be the functioning founder. I rose to the challenge in order to push the project forward and never asked for this to be retroactively fixed. I’m asking to fix this since many community members and investors have asked me to get more active in the project in order to see it through to its glory days.

In the past, I raised capital to extend our runway, leveraged my professional contacts and put my name on the line, built industry relationships, went on podcast after podcast, spent hours and hours in Discord, and ultimately built the baseline for what our community is. Ultimately, I played the role of what a CEO would do in a traditional startup with zero ability to actually direct much past fundraising. Before that, I wrote the original whitepaper, came up with the brand and name a year before I got anyone else involved in the project. Ultimately, the role of what a founder would do in a traditional startup with far less upside than what a founder would ask for. I think, by far, I’m the lowest compensated Founder/CEO type role in any defi project or Web2 project that I’ve ever heard of.

Further, when I started it I had another company that I eventually had to shut down (and convert to Universe) since BarnBridge swallowed my life. I shut down a company doing 7 figures in revenue to focus on BarnBridge and never mentioned the opportunity cost.

I think I was idealistic when structuring it this way, but in the long run it took a toll on the project as I wasn’t, and am still not, incentivized to take on this role. In other words, I took on all of the risk without asking for any of the reward or upside.

When we do this overall conversion (after speaking to other industry leaders who think its a joke I continue to go above and beyond after only taking on 3% of the initial supply in order to ensure the initial whitepaper was delivered), I want to go back and fix some of the original cuts that are generally unfair given the output of some founding groups who took 6.5% of the supply vs. me getting 3%.

The conversion from the BOND token to BARN token gives us a unique opportunity for us to fix something we didn’t get right the first time. We have the chance to look back at who we would have wanted to be most incentivized or included at token launch knowing what we know now. It also gives us a chance to keep people incentivized going forward so we don’t lose them to the market.

Further, certain other people were also shortchanged who helped from the beginning or now were affected by the core team cuts never being re-negotiated. I suggest we align their interests as well.

Some people were never compensated from moving on from my original company (Pavlo and Vitalik, for instance, I gave some of my tokens further diluting myself), Christian, Max, and Stu who crush it for us should be aligned as well. Max’s share helps for past work and aligning us closer with FIAT. A ton of the most recent invigoration and tokenomic work was done by Max. Even though he was busy working on FIAT, he still took the time to spend hours upon hours helping me get everything organized and brainstorming.

I also think it’s important we align the self organized working group. People like Mike987, Erin Dana, Ser Link, and Bilbo Bondbags have gone far and above what a community member would be asked to do in a project.

I’m proposing we use this opportunity to align / incentivize the people who we want to have the most vested interest in making BarnBridge as successful as possible by inflating the BARN supply by 20% to incentivize the people / groups below:

As far as Q goes, this is an interface company/development shop I started to build on top of BarnBridge and took on external investment to accomplish this task. Most of the operations team asked to follow me and move over. I hired a smart contract developer named Stuart Hunter who worked with me at Token Foundry (ConsenSys) who was working at JP Morgan building smart contracts for repo markets.

I’ll formally announce Q later this month, but ultimately I need to align incentives with this team and my investors so there is no conflict of interest. I also think the BarnBridge community should want us incentivized to put a strong focus on BarnBridge without having to deal with conflicts of interest. The 5% to Q is sufficient to align us and the investor groups to not mind if we are focusing in a lopsided capacity, up front, on BarnBridge. This also gives me an additional team to focus on getting things right.

We made an agreement with Universe when Troy launched Multiverse that we do not intend to sell Q’s allotted allocation but, rather, they are for voting on the protocol. In other words, we intend to use them to enact change on the protocol since we are doing work on it and will need to influence votes for features.

The most important part of this is that it puts governance in the hands of the people and groups actively working on the protocol and incentivizes them to make decisions that are in the best interest of the protocol.

I’ll also mention that ultimately, if people want me to serve in a founder/leader/CEO capacity (even though it’s a DAO and not a company), I need to be compensated accordingly. I do have other things I can work on and I value my time even if I’m honorable enough to work with misaligned incentives for a prolonged period of time in hopes that it all works out for all parties involved. For it to make sense for me to take on more of a founder role, I need to be compensated such that the protocol’s success translates into a benefit that is meaningful to me. I have a plan for how to re-invigorate the protocol so I believe doing this is in the protocol’s best interest.

I would say the same of the working groups. They have gone above and beyond, in my opinion, and continue to. We want them to be incentivized to stick with us and focus their effort on re-invigorating BarnBridge.

For the sake of decentralization I think it’s important that founders of defi protocols ultimately leave and let the community take over since their influence alone damages decentralization. However, I understand the implications of what that would mean right now and I see my refocusing on BarnBridge at the expense of other things I have on my plate as, again, existential.

I feel the same way about the people who have never been properly compensated for their role with BarnBridge and keeping it alive in extended periods of minimal communication. These people have gone above and beyond in their efforts with BarnBridge and in setting in place a working plan for improvement and a North Star for the protocol.

Whether or not people agree with that, is a major part of what is being opened for discussion here.

Reinvigorate Rewards System (V2)

*Working on Timeline for Reward Mechanic

Troy and I were originally against minting BOND with a fixed supply. We’ve essentially sat and watched our fixed treasury dwindle without putting it to work to test and incentivize rewards on the platform. In short, every single defi protocol does rewards in one way or another, and traditional finance groups also use sales incentives for this same purpose.

Worse, because of the cost of voting on the DAO, we’ve had to utilize rewards in the products as something that is far more bulky than what the community wants or what would reward community participation. In other words, we can’t build competitive reward structures that are in line with the industry, and we also cannot move fast enough to keep up.

I’ve talked in depth in the Discord about how I believe the concept of bonding by Olympus is a premium rewards gauging mechanism when compared to what AAVE, Compound, Curve, and other groups are doing. I propose we utilize that as a tool for our DAO to proactively join pools in SMART Alpha and SMART Yield (approved by governance) so we can make better product level decisions.

Keep in mind, any inflation or deflation (burning the token) can be turned off, easier than it will be to turn it on.

SMART Yield V1.5

In working with the FIAT DAO team, the Q.xyz team realized some things will need to be updated to SMART Yield in order for it to work properly with FIAT with enhanced functionality.

Timeline: 10 Weeks, then Audits

Development Team Information - “Singapore Team”

Start Date - Immediately

Team Composition - Full time Solidity, frontend and backend developers + additional/flexible resources from Singapore & China team.

We have worked with this team on Universe and they’re extremely fast and efficient. Delivering an update like this in 10 weeks is spectacular and I recommend we get something to market as soon as possible to remain competitive. I have experience working with them and know they’ll deliver a great product.

They have already built a proof of concept that works on a test net where the seniors can deposit using a vault. They comped this POC albeit I was willing to pay for it out of pocket. This is already in motion.

Action Items: Audits

Current Singapore Work Spec:

  1. New erc20 token contract for both junior and senior bond
  2. Realized yield vault
  3. Senior underlying vault
  4. Junior underlying vault
  5. Main interface allow deposit/withdraw for junior/senior underlying
  6. Controller interface to interact with provider
  7. Currently targeting aave/polygon, will take a mvp approach to validate the whole idea first
  8. ** Additional: remove the Senior Yield Minting Ceiling, see proposal

New SY Feature Requests:

Requirements

For anything that is configurable in SY, the DAO should be the only party able to change it

  • Adding and closing SY pools
  • Incentivizing pools
  • Setting senior APY limits
  • Protocol upgrades, whether it be a vault or interface upgrade

Opening Up the Borrowing Power (Seniors)

Problem:

First, we’ll redefine some components of the interface from senior and junior. Senior will be called fixed rate deposits. Juniors will be called leveraged variable rate deposits.

Currently, in our smart contracts, we lock off being able to borrow on fixed rate deposits from the originator at the originators’ same LTV & liquidation thresholds.

Solution:

The Singapore team has created a POC that does this and there are some edge cases we need to work through. Further, we need to build in the functionality of liquidations.

Creating Realized Yield for Junior Deposits to Incentivize

A nice feature of BB Core Team scope is the concept of adding realized yield from the junior pool to attract seniors. This feature can help to create incentives which would be offset by the MATIC and AVAX rewards. I think we bite this one feature because it completes why the seniors are giving up their AVAX and MATIC and why the juniors are fine with the realized yield.

Leverage Loop

When the Realized Yield is higher than what is listed on the originator (AAVE) you can create a lever loop in the Q system that allows you to lock in a fixed rate for up to a year and then borrow at a variable rate on AAVE. When the arbitrage opportunity is done you can unwind your position (unlever).

This would need to be on an L2 (AVAX, Polygon, or Optimism) or it won’t make sense.

Liquidity

With the introduction of Q you can unwind your NFT lever loop positions so you don’t have to wait until maturity to get liquidity back from the lever loop.

Technical Implementation Requirements

Primary Functionality

We need to open up the borrowing power for senior bonds, to do so we will need to add at least three functions to the base Barnbridge protocol SCs.

ERC20 IMPLEMENTATION

BB SY will be moving to a fixed schedule (can be 30, 60, 90 days e.g. Jan 1 - Jan 30), people can enter and exit at any point within the 30 days but you will only earn yield if you stay until maturity.

Realized Yield

  • Everything the Junior Accrues for the bond period gets put into a pool that is the realized yield for the next bond period.
  • How we distribute the matic to the junior when they leave the pool early, this might be in the current BB smart contract but we need to look into.

SY V2

We believe the best V2 at the moment will be creating more originators to higher yield protocols. We’ll need this for both BarnBridge and Q.xyz to remain competitive with incoming competition.

7 Likes

Moving the DAO to Optimism is a no-brainer in my opinion. Gas fees on mainnet make it prohibitive to vote, specially for the smaller holders. We’re already one of the more distributed DAOs, this should bring forth engagement from the wider community instead of a small percentage of larger holders.

4 Likes

I would suggest to make some more things right. I know this maybe old news, but some long time bond bag holders (like myself), used our own products and got badly hurt (of course I am talking about cream exploit). I know community tried to raise some money which I am personally very grateful for and at the end it was not BB fault, but it still leaves some community members in bitter. I would suggest to drop something extra for those who got hurt.
Other than that, I feel happy with the proposal.
Thank you

Happy to see this change:

My main concern here is: when/where is BARN being burned vs when/where is it being emitted?

I might be illiterate today but I didn’t follow that.

Second most important question, is there any talk about charging fees for Smart Yield or Smart Alpha?

How much was lost in that? My overall issue with this is it was communicated that this was an extremely risky pool and it wasn’t on BarnBridge that it was lost. Our pools worked properly.

My main concern here is: when/where is BARN being burned vs when/where is it being emitted?

I might be illiterate today but I didn’t follow that.

^This is decided by governance via snapshot.

Second most important question, is there any talk about charging fees for Smart Yield or Smart Alpha?
^This should also be decided by governance. But we are changing the fixed side to a deposit fee so its a true fixed income and works with FIAT.

I am extremely disappointed by the “Re-align Team Shares” section of this proposal. It reminds me of the arbitrary spin off of Fiat Dao that the community never got to vote on and spent three months waiting for.

I agree that people who are working on the project should be compensated, and interests should be aligned, but for one person to decide the allocation of 20% worth of inflation is the opposite of the so called DAO first approach one preaches. What metrics are these decisions based on? Discord engagement?

We are giving 5% of the new token to Q.xyz because our founder is the founder of said company. Why? Is it the best fit for us? Or is it because we have the same founder? Is there a better option? Is there a cheaper option? Has there been a selection process?

I am sure Tyler had all the above thought through, but in the spirit of transparency, I think it would be nice to know how he came to these conclusions. What metrics were considered when deciding the 20% inflation allocation? I’ve been a community member with more than 1% of the token since day one and I struggle to come up with such precise allocations myself. What makes Q.xyz the undisputed top choice?

Looking forward to your reply.

5 Likes

As you said in Discord, some kind of vesting schedule for this allocation so the current investors don’t get dumped on makes sense and sounds like a reasonable compromise.

1 Like

20% inflation of BARN supply with no vesting! Is this a joke?!
Does one person really get to decide who gets to be incetivised? That is not fair governance.
Incentives need to be looked at in a seperate proposal voted on by the DAO when we see results in the protocol.

Did you check Discord lately?

I pretty much agree with everything proposed in general. The new BARN is very much needed and the tokenomics will hopefully give us the utility that has been much discussed in the discord.
The multisig should help make us more nimble and able to excute in a timely fashion with less cost to the community. Not to mention the ease of voting on optimism.
The distribution/payment of BARN as compensation seems to always be a point of controversy in any discussion of payment! My thoughts are that those who are working/helping the advancement of Barnbridge should be justly rewarded for doing so. That is how talented people are retained for the continued success of an organization. My first issue is the distribution to “Q” of which I am less familiar than others but that if there are those within Q that are helping to further BB then they should , again, but justly compensated weather that is Troy, Stuart, ect. and be recognized by the DAO for their actions. As always, if you are putting in time and effort then some level is reward is justified.
Lastly, I do feel that some level of vesting of rewards be instituted either as a cliff or linear decay such that the integrity of the BARN token is maintained and value preserved and not sold off. Not sure if this was addressed or somehow implied.
Overall I am in favor the changes proposed with some polishing of the rough edges and look forward to the success of Barnbridge, thanks!

1 Like

I addressed most of this in Discord. Did you get the chance to look at that or should I copy paste it in here? I’m fine doing it - it’s just alot.

Regarding vesting & also FIAT not going through governance:

(I’ll post the information from the Discord so you can see it in one place…)

If there is the opportunity for inflation then it would have to be accounted for in vesting. Otherwise, it functionally would ruin the incentive in the first place.

Also FDT happened mostly nights and weekends and I did try to bring that to the community and ultimately they gave the initial voting to BOND holders who could have staked for governance and determined some of the direction and decisions of that protocol. I can’t stop team members from wanting to go off and start their own thing, I think the community benefitted from that as much as possible.

And ultimately, when you look at vesting, if I had been properly compensated, I’d be a year and a half through my vesting already without having to worry about inflation. If I don’t feel properly compensated I can obviously work on other things. I’m not trying to finesse anyone I’m basically telling my side of the story and asking that the community to fix it.

Not everything comes down to a vote. Singular human beings wanting to step out and create something and then external parties deciding to fund it. How does that affect our protocol? The core dev team did not want to build that product. I would have had to find a team to build that product. Why would they not want to have incentives and autonomy elsewhere?

A DAO cannot own IP, everything is open source, and creative commons. That’s why we legally cannot affect a fork. The members of FDT didn’t see it as a fork, they tried to give incentive to BOND holders, and ultimately, I don’t own them and neither does BarnBridge. Johannes for 2 months leading up to that was on my own personal out of pocket payroll working on graph related elements for our ecosystem. I don’t own Max, I don’t own Johannes… they wanted to work on something so I tried to keep them within our ecosystem. Johannes was going to accept a job at UMA and I paid him more, personally, just to stick around.

Most of the people on that list are already deep in the weeds helping for years and part of this proposal will require us to move to an inflatable and burnable token. Causing that to vest isn’t an easy conundrum albeit I understand why you want it there.

So I agree this should all be more transparent. That’s why I’ve been doing public AMAs, working with a wide range of community members, and am using forum posts. Which none of this I truly need to do because it is all open source, and I could say “okay we are calling it this and people can signal by moving or not moving.” That’s what happened with Convex and Curve. People just moved over.

Part of what I’m proposing here is we actually send that multisig to be managed by a wider group and voted on by snapshots. But these determinations were set forth in detail before a token was ever minted. So if anyone has anger over Max leaving to start FIAT it would be from the same people who funded FIAT.

So we started with $1m and 2% of the supply - the rest went to what was on NDA at the onset which you saw went to Coinbase. So off that, we’ve built everything you’ve seen to this point. The people who originally funded the project wanted that in place to ensure the whitepaper was delivered. It has been.

Regarding transparency:

This entire proposal started after multiple open AMAs that anyone could have joined and I published everything before hand to a forum. Its as transparent as it could be.

Regarding my ask:

The going rate founders take in this industry is 15%-20%. I’m asking for 8% for me including my original 3% (so 5%) and enough to compensate working groups and companies who need to come in and clean up BarnBridge to make it competitive. Not as a $ reason but also having say in governance. Like I said, I think it is a FAIR ask. I think we need people working on the protocol and the people who already are and have been are already a year and a half vetted out. The current dev team has compensation and incentive and we ultimately need more in order to compete with the $30m that was just raised by Element to compete with SMART Yield or god knows how much of a warchest DYDX has to compete with SMART Alpha. So we can give people incentive via governance or we can sell off the treasury, find mercenaries and piece meal it.

But you get a similar outcome no matter how you dice it or a suboptimal outcome if you don’t.

Regarding transparency and off chain decisions:

I’m not in internal slacks. I’m only here - and then places people self organized and asked me to join. I’ll continue to work in the open (like Forum, Discord, AMAs, and anywhere else people have access to) and invite everyone to those every chance I can. But, like, I am not going to live stream 3am phone conversations on a Saturday evening with Max and let everyone assume they own rights and access to his headspace because they own BOND. So I understand the perceived conflict of interest there but ultimately, that’s not the reality of how this industry works and its also not a realistic expectation from anyone involved in the project. Any spin off that came out of BarnBridge, this community and everything I worked on, people had access to. Including FIAT. Including Universe, including EnterDAO, LeagueDAO and everything else we touched. In my opinion, I’ve gone above and beyond the call of duty and been above and beyond ethical and transparent about things and am suggesting for even more transparency. I want radical transparency within reason and am fine operating in that framework going forward. This should guide more empowered and more informed decisions. So if that is what is being asked, I’m all for it.

When I say, radical transparency within reason, for example, I don’t think code snippets should be getting posted in real time in public discourse to get front run by anon, non-audited teams. But I think how the system is architected and features should be discussed up front. Same should be of other components like marketing and operations. But ultimately, elected representatives still have to do a lot of the work and make many decisions that people don’t want to pay attention to every detail in order to make. If they do, then they can be active and involved and join working groups. That’s exactly what Olympus and Synthetix do if we are looking for North Stars of well run DAOs.

Regarding incentives:

Its also not about the monetary stake. I honestly wish tokens didn’t have values because it would make alot of decisions alot more straightforward and transparent. But we live in a capitalist world and I prefer it that way albeit its not a perfect system. I think the people who put in work to get DAO first swing 2 right should have governance of the platform. Like what if I work my ass off and the SY version I’m building isn’t even accepted into governance? I care about things like that more than I care about the $ amount. I can retire at this point because of things that happened away from BarnBridge. I am working for passion and, yes, I’ll work on other things I’ve helped create, incubate, fund, and am a part of. Like I’m not dropping out of the Illuvium Discord or the PleasrDAO Telegram chat. But I want to focus on BarnBridge because I care about it irrationally more than those other 2 projects which I have far more financial incentive to care about. Because I think it should and could be so much more than what it is right now.

With that said, I think it DOES matter for other people who have rose to the occasion who don’t have anywhere close to 1% of the supply and have worked and worked with no expectation, so I’m asking for them… they didn’t ask me to put them in there. Past that, I shouldn’t be expected to buy BOND off market because I know I’m about to bust my ever living ass, potentially through a down market, to push this forward. I can’t really talk about what Link is saying ^^ because it affects regulations and ultimately, its a governance token and I think these people deserve a seat at the table in governance for what is going to happen over the coming months and years. And I personally think we should align those people and their incentives.

Regarding the concerns of cuts:

image

So I think this image is important. It’s in place to understand who controls the multisig which allows the treasury to be more fluid and for governance to be more nimble. The question you need to ask yourself is if you trust these people to honor gasless snapshots even if they are not in their own interest. My answer is yes, for me, but ask yourself. We can impeach anyone on this list including me.

image

This list was the point of contention and with someone asking about Dmob in this proposal.

Dmob (core dev team) took 6.5% of the supply. I think that’s ample incentive so they’re not on this list. Regarding their dilution in this scenario, they’re still the most incentivized dev shop on the protocol.

From Mike onward they’re part of a larger community working group. They self organized and have worked for MONTHS on trying to right wrongs on the original vision. They have their own discord and my guess says thousands of messages have gone there making this one less active but they have worked very hard. Mike especially has busted his ass and helped with SMART Alpha pro diagrams. Honestly I’m sad it even went there because imo too much alpha is there that is resulting in SWOT analysis of how SA can stay competitive against perps and options. It was supposed to be a primitive but the market moves fast and I think we have to accept we may have missed tokenized risk being a primitive to the perps and options we planned to build on top. So now the primitive has to compete on its own right or find a North Star since nothing is built on top of it.

Q.xyz is a company I started. Like multiverse which Troy stared for universe, the plan is to build on top of BarnBridge and other defi protocols at the interface layer. I tried to create synthbridge and other partnerships but ultimately where value accrues was always an issue and double DAOs create 2 token model which is a nightmare. So Q hasn’t been announced and will be formally but ultimately we’ve only focused on barnbridge so far and aave, curve, fiat and yfi will be natural step 2s. Q isn’t supposed to be doing protocol development. It’s supposed to build interfaces between protocols that larger centralized groups can easily integrate.

For anyone thinking I am double dipping on Q and my ask. 1. I own 17% of Q. It helped me build an autonomous dev team using external capital at no expense to barnbridge. However they’ll want ROI so if we bring value to barnbridge this aligns my investors and talent to our goals. 2. We do not plan to sell these tokens and have special shares structures set up where the investors can’t dump outside of bankruptcy. Ultimately it’s on me and @Troy | Q.xyz if we sell and I think anyone can extrapolate why I’d be against that selfishly. The purpose of Q having stake is to have governance. If we provide value to barnbridge I’ll want more protocols governance tokens. Including the ones I listed provided via grants.

So think of Q as a 8 person team who is fixing primitives on the front half to build sick ass interfaces on the back half. I call it a degen jungle gym and think it’s a gap in the market. If I can’t provide value to barnbridge then we should pack it up.

The reason we are structuring it as a way company and not a DAO is two fold: 1/ I want to show the community that ANYONE can build on barnbridge permissionlessly once the protocols are proper 2/ if enforcement comes in for kyc aml I HAVE to have a legal structure to save barnbridge.

Tyler - no way to do this without sounding ego wild. So I’ll just say… I’m asking for 8% (5% + started w 3%) + whatever I get through Q. I’m still below average rate on defi at 15% and honestly I want that because I want it to decentralize away from me long term. I live a blessed life and I’m happy. I wasn’t going to ask for anything and when the other founders and investors talked sense into me it came down more to “well shit if everyone thinks I deserve this and I’m autistically saying no worries GGs” then other parties may have a bigger issue with it but they won’t speak up. (edited)

Pavlo and Vitalik - these were my employees at Proof. Day 1 I did not want to move them over for their own job security of the risk of starting a defi protocol. They wanted to and begged me and ultimately just stopped servicing my clients to hang around here. They do interface work, build the website, answer questions, wrote all the docs, have not missed a single call, and honestly if you don’t know who they are (talking in aggregate) you haven’t been paying attention. I moved Mark my brother to universe and he took 1.5% of the supply. Pavlo and Vitalik asked to stay on barnbridge. They begged actually. They had every incentive to leave. They’re humble and from Ukraine and the cost of living is low there but they helped build this as much as anyone. Pavlo when I’ve gotten frustrated has corrected me constantly to come back and get involved. 90% of times I come in here in heated situations it’s cuz pavlo messages me at 2am his time to answer something I missed. They’re ninjas and they received less than 1000 bond each. They’ve been compensated elsewhere on things I started and they’re not broke but their undying loyalty to barnbridge hasn’t been rewarded. It should be.

Christian and Max - they’re similar. They came on in the spring. Christian was the ceo of alethio and came over from a sales role he made more money working at Amazon. He is EXTREMELY organized and offsets me being way too all over the place. Christian has experience hiring, firing, problem solving and serves as the COO of barnbridge in general up to this point and often and internal peacekeeper. People say he isn’t ever in discord. He is an operator. He is a straight to the point closer and handled everything from structuring Erin Dana kpis to taking calls with the ecosystem for partnership ops. Coinbase calls? Christian. Binance has issues. Christian. Lido wants to talk integrations? Christian. Interfacing with snx and optimism for partnership announcements. Christian. He isn’t a community facing role even inside of a company. He’s the guy in billions who fixes everything for the redhead and asks for no glory.

Max… If anyone doesn’t understand the the value fiat brings to barnbridge they aren’t paying attention. Max put his entire net worth into barnbridge (did not know it at the time) and watched it dwindle from 40 to 20. Instead of bitching he decided to join the team, provide ideas, run the community, empower the community, and launch fiat which he saw as existential for their success. Further instead of being bitter about it and favoring competitors he gave feedback and spent hours and hours over Christmas to work with me through tokenomics and ultimately helping to find our North Star and revival of the protocol. If max doesn’t deserve an allocation then idk who does tbh. He gave barnbridge his absolute all and continues to even though I’ve enabled him not to. He could just fuck w fiat and leave us. We absolutely should incentivize him to care because he may grow more powerful than us. I’m not betting against max. Neither should you. He has only shown loyalty and helped where he can with the enablement he was given pre fiat and even after being busy.

Stu is a unique scenario. He is one of the best devs in the ecosystem. So is the core team and they respect his resume and want to work with him.

So let’s talk about his resume. Stu is the CTO of Q. He is Canadian and lives in NYC he cannot work for a DAO because of visa issues. He helped me and Harrison build the most profitable thing to ever come out of consensys pre 2019 called token foundry. I’ve seen him stay up 3 nights straight to hit deadlines. He went to JP Morgan after consensys fell apart and he was promoted numerous times and had to put in a 60 days notice because of how needed he was. He was building repo markets on permissioned networks and it took me a year to talk him into coming and working with us. But Stu came on to build Q which he is all in on. I naturally need Stu to focus on barnbridge protocol work fixes before we can even build interface related work. He architected smart yield v1.5 and the entire new dao infrastructure with me. He has zero incentive and I don’t want to create a Kansas City Shuffle scenario where he only works on barnbridge and cannot build Q but ultimately he is who is talking to major unnamed groups about ensuring our back end and api/sdk are aligned to easily let them plug into us. Stu could have rightfully said, “dude forget barnbridge we can just integrate with protocols that need no solidity work.” Instead he rolled up his sleeves and said let’s get it done. My gut says incentivize Stu more than anyone. I’ve worked with him for 5 years now and if JP Morgan needed him that bad, so do we.

He manages the mercenary dev groups building SY1.5 & the new DAO work. We need him and we aren’t easily recruiting more JPM devs anyone actually trusts.

I just wanted to clarify this wasn’t light hearted or haphazard.

The group building SY helped build the entire back end for universe and the group building the DAO stuff George from LimeChain who coded Polymorphs in a weekend and is the leader of EnterDAO recommended them for the work they did building the graph. They are not in need of tokens as they’re dev shops for hire but they aren’t scrubs either. I didn’t hire discord “hey I’m a dev plz hire me” people I spent months recruiting talent to parallel dmob on what they’re building w sailor because we have to ship faster and that’s not a knock on them it’s a knock on scaling teams and what’s needed to do that.

We tripled the size of the team in general. Original core team took 12.5%. We’re doing 20% but ultimately we’re in a better spot now which is why I don’t deserve 15%-20% like a founder at onset asking and the now team doesn’t deserve 36% asking. But some variance between 3x and zero is appropriate imo.

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Need a clear, slow and long vesting schedule for the Team Shares. preferably 100 weeks or longer. Uncontrolled dumping of tokens should be prohibited by terms of the contract. please do not ignore this request if you really care for the overall community!

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I appreciate the contributions of every individual/entity in the list for redistribution. I also think it’s impossible to objectively define a cut-off for who should or should not be included in such a redistribution, which is why I am hesitant about the idea at best.

Furthermore, there is clear potential for the most basic kind of conflict of interest a DAO can have here: a small-in-number cohort of governance token holders with a large enough share of the supply that they can effectively vote to grant themselves an even larger share of governance tokens. It’s clear that such optics aren’t the intent of the proposal, but they are potentially one way of looking at the outcome if you zoom out far enough. I understand the case about mistakes in the initial distribution, but the proposed redistribution seems fundamentally at odds with the stated goal of further long-term decentralization.

Before this proposal moves forward, we should ask @lordtylerward or other proponents of a redistribution to demonstrate that the current BOND holdings of all people/entities slated to receive a portion of the proposed 20% inflation do not constitute a quorum sufficient to pass a “yes” vote regardless of how the thousands of other tokenholders feel. If the recipients of the redistribution hold enough BOND to vote this through on their own, then it is incumbent on them, for the sake of the DAO, to not abuse that power and think of other ways to meet the goals of the redistribution.

In short, I don’t think it’s right to effectively “call a Mulligan” and execute such a significant redistribution / concentration of governance power – never mind the monetary value of the tokens.

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To this point… I agree it can be a slippery slope but up to this point we have primarily rewarded mercenaries who used stablecoins to farm and dump BOND. And most of the compensation came from external investors into a team run multisig which I am proposing we do away with and make that process far more transparent.

Agreed and why I think we set forth a group of people who aren’t going to do that and their role as multisig guardians is to uphold snapshot votes. Further, the way decentralization works is if we are doing that after product market fit is found 1. large holders won’t want to rattle the baby 2. the community can ultimately fork the value away from the vultures/hoarders and move on without them (like a more community run version of Sushi attacking Uniswap).

Right now, what is distrupting long term decentralization is the LP pool, which is more disproportionate than our current distribution. We can give tokens to mercenaries or compensate people working on the protocol which is part of what I am proposing we do here.

Hmm okay this is a good point - currently this wouldn’t be enough for 40% of quorum or the 60% threshold of yes. I actually wanted to DROP these numbers a bit because of how close recent votes have been but this makes me realize if we move quorum to 30% and yes threshold to 50% then we have alot more power than I’m intending. So actually now that I’m realizing that this actually helps that because I expect all these people will be active in governance… now I think we keep it at 40% quorum and 60% agreement.

Thank you for bringing up one thing that I hadn’t thought through enough clearly to this point and bringing your feedback.

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