A Second Swing at DAO First

I responded to this in Discord in detail this morning - just want to make sure someone reading this doesn’t think I am ignoring it per Dumbo’s request. You can sort and filter by me and Dumbo there to see the conversations.

I follow the logic behind this plan. However, in order to support this proposal I would appreciate to see an update to the proposal addressing the below items:

i) introducing a vesting period inline with market standard. applying to all listed members.
ii) for non-dev members I would expect a kind of performance indicator to be met. (example TVL > $xxxM)

I understand concern i) has been discussed broadly.
Appreciate a thorough reflection on item ii) as so far efforts to grow TVL did not materialize.


Unfortunately with the mechanics of a rebasing token, vesting would effectively eliminate much of the benefit the 20% is supposed to provide. Also, if fair compensation would have occurred on an ongoing basis, these tokens would already be vested. What do you think about making the wallet addresses public as a safeguard against dumping?

Regarding KPIs, my understanding is that it would be brutal to code, could be very easy to game (we used to have high TVL, but it was mostly from mercenary capital ACTUALLY dumping their rewards on us), and I think a lot of this is based on past performance / future alignment so like a stock option, the value of this benefit is going to be commensurate to the value accrual to the protocol reflected in token price.

A big part of this also has less to do with price and more with the ability to hit quorum / pass votes. At the current rate it is going to be increasingly difficult to do anything on the DAO. If the majority of these tokens are locked up in vesting contracts the ability to enact the change we need to move us in the right direction is going to be severely muted.

I would recommend evaluating the overall direction and development activity that is being pitched to rapidly advance BarnBridge compared to where we are right now and the health of the DAO before Tyler got super involved again. Then all you have to decide is whether or not you want to establish greater alignment to ensure the people responsible for this have a reason to stick around and continue doing more of the same. Not that the team will stay forever or that they will rage quit on BB tomorrow if this doesn’t pass, but need to give the team a reason to make this their #1 priority.


—> Second Swing - But this time the ball is teed up.

It really is undeniable the amount of thought (and already the work) put into this proposal. I would like to acknowledge everyone who has already stated their opinion/asked questions.

I have been around the block, through the ringer and back again… and for those community members who remember early contributions/contributors, you all know I am a loyal dog and will abide with transparency and truthfulness. That being said - I fully believe this proposal is the best thing for BB that has been discussed in a very long time.

I came here thinking I wanted to state my position and expand on some of the community concerns, but it appears they have all/mostly been acknowledged. Instead I would like to highlight some of the major attributes suggested I believe will impact BB for the best;

1 - Look at the ambitious timelines suggested by the three main cohorts (Q.xyz / SADT / Singapore), this is a major/radical undertaking and is what is needed. If your not leading change you’re already falling behind.

2 - DAO move to Optimism while it is still fresh, keeping ties with all things Mainnet for possible upgrades and future buildouts, as they come. This is important as many of the BB partners, backers also have/are building out to Optimism as well. This keeps doors open and could open more.

3 - Stifle mercenary capital (the came, they saw, they took). Although great for decentralization it was tough on initial backers and retail. Reinvigorating reward systems at the right time could create the hype needed to get us back on the map.

4 - Allowing a nimble and much more inclusive voting mechanism (via Optimism) allows Barnbridge to keep up and possibly surpass the DAO pack. Smaller holders can now “be heard” and participate in governance. Community drives product for themselves versus the 1%'ers.

DAOfirst has its flaws, and we experienced that first hand (should actually say “First DAOfirst”) - that being said, Tyler and the team have built what they set out to complete and can pop smoke (disappear) anytime. But… If you haven’t noticed, the BB team are also “loyal dogs” to the community, and know that BB DAO will almost likely fizzle out with out their continued support. Obligation is a poor reason to remain involved and this proposal reads as an exciting new start to what would have been an anti-climatic end.


Thanks, this all makes sense, appreciate the thoughtful reply.
Here are a couple of unrelated thoughts I wanted to get out there:

(1) As a point of procedure, I feel like I’ve been paying decent attention to the discussion, but I haven’t seen a clearly laid out proposal for the rebasing mechanism for BARN. I am inferring from the flow of the conversation on Discord that this is meant to be OHM-style “rebasing” and not pure price-to-supply AMPL-style rebasing. Is there another forum discussion I’m missing that lays out the details? Or could those details be added to the proposal summary?

(2) As a matter of DAO ethics, how do we think this process should look and work for the many folks who earned BOND through Coinbase Earn but for whom it has been cost-prohibitive to participate in on-chain governance (since transferring their BOND out of Coinbase would cost ~10x more than their BOND is worth)?

Coinbase Earn holders possibly comprise a majority of unique tokenholders (anyone have rough numbers on that?), and I believe that the DAO benefits from their holding insofar as their existence may be used to argue that DAO governance rights are widely distributed. Unless Barnbridge is able to make arrangements in advance directly with Coinbase to execute the swap on these folks’ behalf, I expect this proposal to wipe out most if not all Coinbase Earn participants. Maybe we are okay with this because they “took from the DAO but didn’t give back” by staying off-chain, but their holding is more valuable to the DAO than those who earned and immediately sold. My take is that the DAO ought to look after Coinbase Earn participants by coordinating with Coinbase to make sure these folks aren’t left behind. I think it would be good for generating attention about the new token model as well if Coinbase announces it to Earn participants (or all customers).

Anyone claiming a true DAO needs to be transparent and democaratic. Whether there has been or not in this case is debatable. I only learned about Q.xyz in the proposal. 5% to them I suppose?!

I agree working groups need to be compensated but when the most concrete thing in the proposal is a 20% inflation to a working group, it’s worrying. What does “clean up BarnBridge to make it competitive” really mean? Its a nice buzzword for your average retail BOND bagholder who has been beaten and bled into goblin town, but what is the action plan for this 20% shadow cabinet?

  1. What are the objectives to clean up BarnBridge to make it competitive again?
  2. What are the deliverables of the chosen group to clean up BarnBridge to make it competitive again?
  3. What are the KPIs we are measuring to clean up BarnBridge to make it competitive again?

You are in total control and thats fine if you think its too hard to take me seriously but 20% reallocation paired with opaque deliverables retail risks getting burnt twice by the same flame - even worse ceding control of governance of the DAO to an exclusive cabal that was picked single handedly.

Maybe. Just maybe, you don’t throw out sour milk, you put it back in the fridge and try again later.

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  1. Hey did you read this over?
    Notion – The all-in-one workspace for your notes, tasks, wikis, and databases.

  2. We are talking to Coinbase - I don’t know how we get around the dust situation you’re talking about though. We may have to mint and give coins to Coinbase, we’ll know more after we talk to them.

Thanks, yes I have read this. It doesn’t explicitly mention anything about BARN being a rebasing token, hence the question, though it does talk about token rebalancing (the meaning of which I didn’t fully follow at the time, though I gathered it was an OHM-like mechanism).

Overall I think there are some good ideas in this proposal and some bad ones.

  • I am hugely in favor of the proposal to move governance to Optimism and support a token swap to the extent that it enables this.
  • I am against any rebasing supply mechanism that isn’t necessary for the protocol to function – which it definitely isn’t in Barnbridge’s case.
  • I am against the dilution of existing holders to give 20% of governance to the identified members. I would support a separate proposal to fund, from the treasury, the individuals on the list who have already demonstrated their commitment.
  • Along the lines @gavblizzard raised, I think Q.xyz should submit a separate proposal outlining its objectives, deliverables, KPIs and term for a grant and leaving it up to BOND holders to evaluate.

I’ve taken up more space than I should here, so I will leave it at that except to respond to any clarifying questions. Thanks for hearing me out.

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This thread came out later since we have been talking about it but a few things here:

  1. I’ve discussed rebasing mechanism in general but ultimately we are bonding to play with how rewards and incentives work in the ecosystem. So think of Olympus bonding to be a reserve currency & us doing it to be more nimble in how we handle rewards on the platform. Or, if we end up building a lending market, it would affect how we collateralize the market at onset or ongoing vs. how AAVE does it on the back end in the scenario of a collapse.

  2. Which individuals are you not sure have demonstrated value? This is the link in Discord where I spell out who is what and what is going where: Discord

  3. Q is overseeing both the newer iterations fo SY that make us integratabtle with FIAT along with the actual changes to the DAO.


I’m not going to respond to the shadow cabal stuff - I did in Discord where you’ve had a collective 15 posts until this proposal and most of them have been critical providing no solution whatsoever to anything.

Instead I’ll copy and past all the vesting and KPI stuff…

I understand the vesting and kpi ask. It’s a nice to have from a coding perspective because I don’t think the people I am asking tokens for are going to dump. They’ve stuck around this long and already shown their colors by contributing when there are other things we could all work on from an opportunity cost perspective that are easier than reviving this. I see the request as fair and doing the right thing and “trust but verify” also takes a human element of trust out of the equation when we aren’t asking people to ape into unaudited smart contracts. We’re asking you to trust the team.

And ultimately, when you look at vesting, if I had been properly compensated, I’d be a year and a half through my vesting already without having to worry about inflation. If I don’t feel properly compensated I can obviously work on other things. I’m not trying to finesse anyone I’m basically telling my side of the story and asking that the community to fix it.

As soon as we vest the tokens they can’t take part in rebasing or voting, for 100 weeks. The entire point of this has to do with people working having a share in governance and I don’t see how vesting accomplished that without requiring substantial additional code that gets in the way of other things we should be focused on. I don’t think we should be writing code to adhere to paranoia but instead things that help us compete in the market.

If you want to write a smart contract and handle the front end, back end and auditing… that tracks rebasing, creates a derivative in the DAO that manages those vested tokens voting and staking, is non transferable and vests according to KPIs be my guest but some things are easier said than done.

And ultimately writing this alone would take talent off either Sailor, SyV1.5, the DAO work itself and the rebasing mechanism.

It’s scope creep for an absurd reason from 2 people who’s contribution to this project has been negative posting in speculation and just Monday morning quarterbacking about issues with no reasonable solutions that don’t require someone else doing all the work to help quell their paranoia. Less so @dumBOND there but ultimately we can appease a vocal minority or we can focus on building products that compete which is what the bulk majority of this Discord wants to see and has to wade through negativity to get there or maybe is just lurking and won’t speak up.

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Ok without diverting or resorting to personal attacks. Here is a few simple questions for you.

1)Are you willing to move your 20% aligned incentives to a seperate proposal? and run with the initial proposal that has no mention of incentives :
Notion – The all-in-one workspace for your notes, tasks, wikis, and databases. ?

If no, why not? Is your motivation (a) or (b) ?

To quote you in your own words:

(a) “I think I deserve governance in this and I want it because I want to enact change on the protocol.” I truly do not care about the money piece "
(b) "I think, by far, I’m the lowest compensated Founder/CEO type role in any defi project or Web2 project that I’ve ever heard of "

Frustrating and incredibly dissapointing when you cannot and refuse to provide the community with clear objectives, KPIs and deliverables of a working group that will receive 20% of supply

I responded in Discord repetitively and you’re just repeating yourself. You came into Discord on December 15th and have done nothing but blast every action from Erin Dana’s work to the Floki pool which is 25% of SMART Alpha, to just generally being upset about us moving to a new token model. I get it, you’re upset. You’ve offered zero solutions, little help, and I’m done responding to you at this point.

Intro & Context

Hi everyone, Keegan at [4RC] here. I’ll preface our comments by stating that our sole criteria for evaluating / participating in BarnBridge governance is to support the long-term health of the protocol and ultimately value accrual to BOND / BARN token holders.

A bit of context on 4RC for anyone that may not know us or our history with BarnBridge. We led the seed round in August 2020 and consider ourselves extensions of the core team due to the high touch relationship on all things tokenomics, product modeling, go-to-market strategy, composability, education, recruiting, etc. Also worth noting that we haven’t sold a single vested token due to our conviction in both of the following:

  • Long term usage and success of BarnBridge’s core product offering (SY / SA) scaling within the global finance industry once custodial and regulatory barriers to entry for TradFi are solved for externally
  • Tyler, Troy, and the core team

High-level thoughts on trust and decentralized governance:

  • Despite Tyler’s push for radical transparency which we believe is executed well above status quo for web3 founders, it is not practically realistic for all discourse related to a project to be public and well-organized for feedback from the entire community. This is where the “100% decentralized and trustless” meme of DeFi / web3 is reality-checked and proves to be more nuanced in practice as token holders often must compromise on governance scope in the interests of capital efficiency and speed to market. Strong founders inevitably maintain a degree of autonomy around recruiting dev talent, managing scope creep, and aligning incentives. With that said, after more than a year of working with Tyler on this project and multiple others, we have faith in his abilities and motives to manage these functions in the interests of all BOND holders.

Proposal Feedback

  • Migrate BOND to BARN

    • Pros: Introduce flexible monetary policy (mint / burn) to bootstrap protocol usage with a long-term goal of sustainable rev-share to token holders from organic fee-paying demand for fixed income and volatility products
    • Cons: Negative narrative around “OHM ponzinomics” - mercenary yield farmers and inflation-based quadruple digit APYs are not the goal of this proposal in introducing OHM style monetary policy. We instead believe that there is significant alignment between the SY / SA products and the bonding and treasury liquidity use cases of OHM style token mechanics.
  • Move DAO to Optimism

    • Pros: Agile, capital efficient governance fit for BarnBridge’s iterative transparent approach to finding product market fit. 4RC could also be in favor of lowering quorum thresholds while BarnBridge is still in its infancy to reduce participation requirements in anticipation of retail voter fatigue from an iterative high-volume approach to proposals
    • Cons: Potential L2 risk, negative narrative around multisig freedom from Wonderland / TIME events - the risk/reward assessment from our vantage point here is pros > cons
  • Align Allocation & Community Interest

    • Pros: Opportunity cost in this space is high, have to incentivize the core team to optimize bandwidth allocation, speed to ship, etc.
    • Cons: This is the biggest risk introduced in the overall proposal IMO, inflating the BARN supply by 20% to incentivize a handful of core team members (most with existing incentives) is a clear risk and low hanging fruit to motivate a dispute with the community. We hear, respect, and thank those who voiced their concerns on the lack of vesting, proper decentralized RFP process for selecting recipients, KPIs, etc. These are all absolutely fair - our stance again comes down to risk / reward assessment trusting the core team and having a privileged look at the thorough non-public thought process behind the allocations. Tyler’s point that they’re already 75 weeks into a 100 week vesting schedule is a fair one - we view this as an effort to fix those original allocations given the benefit of hindsight in identifying the high-value contributors over the last 1.5 years, rather than a conduit for Tyler and team to print a brand new token, give it to themselves, and rug the BOND community. Again - we draw on a long, multi-project track record working with Tyler and evaluating his leadership / recruiting talent to substantiate that trust; however, if the community ultimately feels this should be a separate proposal to allow for more discourse / transparency, 4RC would be happy to vote in favor of that approach as well.
  • Reinvigorate Rewards System

    • Pros: Necessary evil to compete in the current DeFi landscape with a clear feasible approach to protocol-revenue driven yield
    • Cons: “Inflation based APY” narrative / FUD, SNX had a similar mechanism for incentivizing “short liquidity” with inflation based rewards which failed to scale - given our relationship with the SNX team, we can capitalize on lessons learned to avoid repeating these mistakes and evaluate the current liquidity mining / tokenomics incorporated in the modern SNX ecosystem (Kwenta, Lyra, Aelin, etc.)
  • Primary Functionality:

    • Pros: Known necessary upgrades to improve UX / adoption and enable secondary market liquidity on fixed income positions (FiatDAO)
    • Cons: Recursive leverage risk - this is native to DeFi at this point, controllable, and extends far beyond BarnBridge

TL;DR - 4RC is in favor of passing this proposal as is, but receptive to community feedback around splitting out the incentive realignment piece to a following proposal subject to additional review/discussion.


Hard to top Keegan over there. But FWIW, I dislike the compensation package being tied to the protocol upgrade proposal as its just an unnatural fit.

I’d love to see this split into two, but I fear most are going to vote to pass this as-is, as they are already so down in $BOND that they will take any potential life raft being offered to get this back on track (even sifu for treasurer). I don’t have anything wrong with the numbers offered for realigning of the incentives for anybody who is founder, core, working group but again, should not have been tied to such a monumental upgrade.


Couldn’t we just split it out if it didn’t pass? We’ve looped together 10 things in votes many times.

I heard Sifu is looking for a job - should we bump him?

Just stating the obvious but I am in favor of passing this proposal as is, with all of our reasoning at 4RC covered above by Keegan. As always, I trust in Tyler’s leadership.


Hi @lordtylerward ,

I am writing to check if the proposal is still open. We would love to offer a solution to this.


I think it is still open. I can always re-publish.