Governance Barn Raising - Reimbursement for Delegation Gas Fees


Campaign to run through the balance of the year for reimbursement of gas fees for wallets who delegate their voting power before 01/01/22. Reimbursements will be paid a flat $100 in BOND.


Ethereum gas fees have been a deterrent for smaller holders to participate in on-chain governance. This proposal is meant to increase their representation by encouraging delegation of their voting power and motivate other community members to step forward as representatives of the voting community. As an added bonus, should enough wallets delegate we could reduce future quorum challenges.

Technical details

$100 in BOND will be distributed to each wallet who delegates before 01/01/2022. An estimate of 3000 BOND will need to be allocated from the treasury to the multisig to cover roughly 750 wallet delegations. This number is highly unlikely to be needed and as a result any remaining BOND will be returned to the DAO treasury at the completion of the program.

Useful Links

Please check the #delegation channel in discord for community members who have provided their wallets. I have pinned the two wallets currently provided by myself and Erin Dana . I encourage all active community members to raise their hand and offer their wallets for delegation. Ping me in discord and I’ll pin your blurb and wallet address so others may find them easily.



  • Greater community representation for smaller holders.
  • Gas savings for delegates.
  • Potentially less quorum issues moving forward.


  • Snapshot exists currently as a free method for the community to signal proposal preferences.
  • Community may not wish to support the BOND allocation.

DAO Vote


Allocate 3000 BOND for delegation reimbursement?
  • Yes
  • No

0 voters


I think this is a good idea, but it should be combined with an annual “delegation election campaign” - have people put themselves out as delegates with a vision statement to help people select a delegate aligned with their values and priorities if they don’t have someone in mind already. This’d be like that Synthetix did to elect their Spartan council.


This is a great proposal!

I’m a huge fan of this proposal and will likely be introducing a wallet of my own that can be delegated to for the sake of further voter decentralization. Just need to finish a write-up of my core values and commitments as a voter. Thanks Mike for putting this idea forward.

1 Like

I really applaud this idea (and will vote for it), but view it more as a temporary fix or first iteration to solve the problem. To me, the entanglement of participation and quorum are important.

This might solve the quorum problem but perhaps not the participation problem. Isn’t there a deeper question about what form(s) of participation should BB encourage?

Right now, the sole mode of participation for influencing decision-making in the DAO is voting. Perhaps that’s all that’s needed right now from the org outside of the core team (except for the brilliant work Erin, DeFi Dad) and others on Twitter are doing to market BB), in which case that’s fine.

If that continues to be the sole mode of participation, then perhaps the voting model should evolve – e.g. to some sort of campaign style thing like @curmudgeon has suggested. This is because without knowing the outlook and position of the person you’re delegating to, you’re giving away your vote blind (unless they state in advance). And there may come a time where the delegator disagrees with the position of the delegated, in which case the delegator has to choose to leave their vote to be used anyway against their interest, or to undo their delegation and pay the gas fees. Given this quandary, some thought should be put into the responsibilities of delegators and delegated.

I’d also encourage us not to close off discourse around what more can be done to better articulate the goals of the DAO and therefore the opportunities/gaps available for people to get involved in its progress by lending their skills or expertise. Again, it might be that there’s little-to-no need for those in the DAO outside the core team and those marketing BB right now. But if there are other skillsets needed (and I think there are), I found this podcast useful for thinking through this: SpaceCasts (‘How Orca Protocol Aims to Bring Just Enough Order to Crypto Organizations, with Brady Dale’).

Hi! Fellow small investor here. I support this wholly, but I also believe it’s sort of a band-aid solution. I think delegating does work but as @kiran mentioned it’s very possible the delegator and delegatee may not have the same vote.

I think the best solution is to just try to get as many people as possible to vote. There are two potential solutions that can help this:

  1. Gas-less voting. I’m certain there are multiple ways to accomplish this and some research would be required (there are other platforms that do this), but off the top of my head voters could submit their votes by signing a transaction (like Snapshot). Signing a transaction is free. Then those transactions could be immediately committed to an L2 like Polygon with the gas reimbursed by the protocol. In this case Barnbridge would only pay a tiny amount of gas per transaction, but it would allow people to vote with no financial cost. If necessary these transactions can be batched up to L1 or you can simply use an L2 as the authoritative source of truth for vote-related matters just to keep costs down.

It is I think very unrealistic to expect high turnout at the current ETH gas prices. For someone like me even if I wanted to vote I would literally spend more than I make an hour to vote which is hard to justify at my income level.

  1. Provide incentives to voting. You can give POAPs for voting, NFTs, or maybe just do a small end of year airdrop for those that vote. We’d have to think carefully about the implications of rewarding voters, but I think it’s a potential idea. Even a sweepstakes would work!
1 Like

I am a strong proponent of this and - unfortunately - am a good case study, given a relatively small holding at the moment. I hope/plan to increase down the line, once able.

That said, I - too - think it’s an interim solution (to be clear- one worth pursuing). I’d like to vote on my own but it won’t be economically feasible - at least until I own more BOND (again, my intention but a matter of time).

A few other comments mentioned above that resonate with me: i.) l2/gasless voting would be great to explore, if possible & ii.) would love to hear from delegators / raise their hand, so that I could make a more informed decision to delegate.

I would definitely support the proposal for all the aforementioned benefits. In addition, I believe some assurances that delegated voting would not affect participants from any missed rewards from active voting. Some members in the discord have been chagrined by the thought of missing out on rewards distributed from an airdrop by lack of voting. Reassurances may assuage any fears. Thank you!

1 Like

I believe our DAO rewards will finish in roughly 3 months. As i mentioned earlier, there were about 33% adresses of total staked in DAO which participated at least once through PID 1-7. Some of big bag holders did not dare to vote even once. On contrary some small investors did, which is admirable.

But at this point i would rather keep 3000 $BOND and figure out better staking model which could take place as soon as the current rewards will dry up (Feb 2022).

We could come up with the model to compensate active members depending on their voting power. Like Maker last proposal for example. Be aware this is just an example. But we could end up with one adress having like 20% of total voting power. So to avoid that we have to think this through first and then we can discuss the reimbursement again.


This entire post makes me think about that our token should have other utility in the protocol past direct voting. For instance if we could use BOND to just honor pools being added to the interface. I wrote about ideas for state in the past that would give BOND more utility similar to what I just posted before.

This was what it included:

Looking at ways to use $BOND as collateral and getting vote multipliers for doing things the system would need longer term:

  1. Liquidity (hard)
  2. Ratings/Insurance: Backstop for Collateral Multiplier

What if you get a vote multiplier for creating a collateral backstop to pools? In the case of insolvency since we won’t have a mint function. Basically if you lock stablecoins in a pool you are insuring it. If a pool blows up the bond can be sold to cover losses in the pool. It creates a rating system for the safety of pools since nobody will create collateral backstops for poorly designed pools .You could extrapolate this to also work for buying illiquid senior tokens from those pools so the more insured the less lock.

  1. USDB

You create a stablecoin pool where you stake stables for the collateral backstops. Then the proof of liquidity for that pool is USDb and that becomes the stablecoin pool for the entire system so you just provide USDb to pools saving on gas fees as you swap in between stables across all of this and also makes the system more stable where overtime 1 stablecoin going unpegged won’t take down what were deemed as safe pools - like if DAI goes down 90% of the platform incurs losses but this USDb mechanism creates alot of good use cases like risk free rates and our ability to use USDb as the main reference point or “peg” of the whole system. The latter part matters for smart alpha.

This makes the entire system substantially more valuable and difficult to fork.

  1. Another path to a back stop

I think the idea of holding token rewards from integration partners within the treasury could be another way to construct a backstop.

  • It will also allow us to maintain a high level of solidarity with our debt originators
  • It should be an added incentive for vBOND holders by adding more value to the treasury
  • It may encourage participation in governance.
  • It may encourage buyers of our structured debt to also buy into BOND so they can have a say in how the bonus fund gets spentSo bonus tokens from LP rewards can then become our backstop or a portion of it

So our pool backstop could be like a #defi SDR: The SDR is an international reserve asset, created by the IMF in 1969 to supplement its member countries’ official reserves. … The value of the SDR is based on a basket of five currencies—the U.S. dollar, the euro, the Chinese renminbi, the Japanese yen, and the British pound sterling


No. Disagree. If you stake you already get the reward. So this proposal is absurd.

I think this deserves its own proposal.

1 Like

Hey everyone - I saw this today after talking with the Synthetix team.

I wonder if the solution here is to have our DAO have EVM equivalence on Optimism?

1 Like